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HAPPY DYSTOPIANS
By the mid-1970s, it appeared, the predominant usage of the terms ‘mass’ and ‘masses’ had shifted to largely quantitative meanings. Raymond Williams noted that whilst ‘in the right circles and in protected situations, the mob and idiot multitude 
tones’ could still be heard, usage had by and large moved away from ‘the 
older simplicities of contempt’ to the ‘sense of a very large number’.1 
Over a decade later, Andreas Huyssen argued that the era of a con-
sciously high-cultural modernism defining itself against ‘mass culture’ 
was over, shifted into the past by a complex array of political and cultural 
practices, not the least of which was postmodernism’s appetite for the 
forms and genres of popular culture: ‘The uses high art makes of certain 
forms of mass culture . . . blur the boundaries between the two; where 
modernism’s great wall once kept the barbarians out and safeguarded 
the culture within, there is now only slippery ground which may prove 
fertile for some and treacherous for others.’2
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it is possible to see 
a resurgence of the older, non-quantitative languages of anxiety about and 
scorn for ‘the masses’, a return to the tone and conceptual dichotomies, if 
not the vocabulary, marking out again the ‘mob and idiot multitude’ from 
the individuality they simultaneously lack and threaten. Such a resur-
gence should have its heaviest contemporary investment in the field of 
politics, in reactions to what is posited as the undoing of thought, of fact 
and reflection in the perceived populisms that succeeded the financial 
crisis of 2007–08.3 Here I want to consider not a political manifestation 
of the return of ‘the masses’ but a sister ‘allegory of crowd control’, one 
in literature where the returning figure is that of a specifically modern-
ist mass, Dave Eggers’s novel The Circle, from 2013.4 It has none of the 
narrative energy and ironic joie de vivre of the memoir for which Eggers 
first became widely known, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius 
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(2000). It uses a third-person narrator, deadpan, detailed, detached, to 
tell a story of the dismantling of privacy and consequently of individuality, 
autonomy and freedom, in a dystopia of the near future. The novel was 
immediately and widely received as a ‘Brave New World for our brave new 
world’, a warning as ‘important for us now as Nineteen Eighty-Four’ was 
then.5 Margaret Atwood described the novel as a satire of ‘the increas-
ing corporate ownership of privacy, and about the effects such ownership 
may have on the nature of Western democracy’ in which a ‘brave new 
world of virtual sharing and caring breeds monsters’.6 
The ‘monsters’ of The Circle do not take the form of physical crowds 
or assembled masses. They are disaggregated, disembodied, spread 
globally and asynchronously through a homogeneous digital space of 
friendship, community, commerce and love. Such disaggregation has 
indeed been the default form of the masses for over a century, departed 
from only at moments of social crisis when the masses do take to the 
streets, or seem to threaten to. Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd (1895) was 
criticized by Gabriel Tarde, at the height of its sensational reception, 
precisely for confusing ‘the vast realm of opinion or “mental” forms of 
assembly with that much smaller and intermittent realm of “psychic 
connections” produced by physical contacts’.7 For Tarde, the masses as 
a crowd were already the ‘social group of the past’. Public opinion, the 
specifically liberal ideological condition and consequence of the era of 
the popular press, creates a ‘dispersion of individuals who are physically 
separated and whose cohesion is entirely mental’, then emergent as ‘the 
social group of the future’.8
1 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1976), London 
2014, pp. 192–3. 
2 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism, 
London 1988, p. 59. 
3 See Christian Borch and Britta Timm Knudsen, ‘Postmodern Crowds: Reinventing 
Crowd Thinking’, in Distinktion, vol. 14, no. 2, August 2013, p. 109; and Jodi Dean, 
Crowds and Parties, London and New York 2016. 
4 Jeffrey T. Schnapp, ‘Mob Porn’, in Schnapp and Matthew Tiews, eds, Crowds, 
Stanford 2006, p. 12. 
5 Quotations respectively from Ron Charles, Washington Post, 1 October 2013, and 
David Baddiel, ‘Books of the Year’, New Statesman, 3 December 2013. 
6 Margaret Atwood, ‘When Privacy Is Theft’, New York Review of Books, 21 November 
2013, pp. 2–3. 
7 Schnapp and Tiews, Crowds, p. x.
8 Gabriel Tarde, ‘The Public and the Crowd’ (1898), in Terry Clark, ed., Gabriel Tarde 
on Communication and Social Influence: Selected Essays, Chicago 1969, pp. 280–1.
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This group became the dispersed beings of mass culture, socialized even 
as they were atomized, their signature and habitus the escalating ‘com-
modification and colonization of cultural space’ which also entailed the 
penetration of the masses in their new forms into the core spaces of lib-
eralism, those of privacy. Modernism’s other was this form of the mass, 
that of mass culture with which it engaged in a ‘compulsive pas de deux’.9 
The first novel to emit a full-throated scream at these socialized, indi-
vidualized yet massified wreckers of true sociality and true individuality 
was Brave New World. A comparison of Huxley’s 1932 novel with Eggers’s 
2013 version should help us learn something about the continuities and 
ruptures shaping today’s new ‘masses’—and also something about the 
forces literature may be assembling to protect itself from their forms. 
Both novels are built out of an anxiety—and a certain cynicism—about 
democracy. The conditions of the anxiety are presented without drama, 
presuming readers’ assent: science and technology, when coupled with 
the modern state and the stock nostrums of representative government—
‘equality’, ‘progress’ and the rest—provide unprecedented ways of 
centralizing power, but these concentrations of power cannot (and need 
not) tolerate anything outside themselves. ‘Freedom’ and ‘individuality’ 
are necessarily sacrificed: in Brave New World to ‘Community, Identity, 
Stability’; in The Circle to ‘community’, ‘participation’, and ‘transpar-
ency’. This anxiety about democracy is not uncommon in dystopian 
fiction: it may be that the erasure of the political promise of freedom, 
of which democracy is one articulation, is a constitutive component of 
dystopia itself.10 The cynicism is more dispersed in these novels, and is 
historically the most interesting aspect of both. For it is not generated 
by or invested in objective forces hostile to the project of democracy—
political movements, for example, states or corporations. Rather it is 
occasioned by democracy’s potential beneficiaries and agents: people as 
a collective. It is not democracy per se that these texts are cynical about 
but the capacity of people to live up to its ideals. The freedom and indi-
viduality the novels mourn are precisely the qualities that ‘the people’ 
are unequal to.11 
9 Huyssen, After the Great Divide, p. 57. 
10 See Gregory Claeys, ‘The Origins of Dystopia: Wells, Huxley and Orwell’, in 
Claeys, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, Cambridge 2010, p. 
107; also Tom Moylan, Scraps of the Untainted Sky, Colorado 2000. 
11 Throughout this essay, I use the distinction between liberal and democratic tradi-
tions of thinking ‘the people’ as articulated by Chantal Mouffe in The Democratic 
Paradox, London 2000. 
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Total sociability is one thread binding Brave New World and The Circle, 
and distinguishing the category of dystopian fiction to which they 
belong from other texts of the genre. In E. M. Forster’s ‘The Machine 
Stops’ (1909) or George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), a ter-
rible isolation is one of the primary indices of life’s degradation. To 
seek contact with another is itself a key form of resistance. For Huxley 
and Eggers, in contrast, solitude, suffering and privacy are the modes 
of resistance: the regimes which are repudiated are characterized by 
a sociability that aspires to be total. This sociability is not so much 
enforced as it is embraced by those whose compliance or complic-
ity is an essential part of the regime’s dystopian nature. The subjects 
who embrace their own subjection are—again contrary to the domi-
nant conventions of the genre—happy subjects, happy dystopians. 
‘Community, Identity, Stability’ is the ‘World State’s motto’, carved into 
the physical landscape of the city and the first page of Huxley’s novel. 
Eggers disperses his equivalent mottos. In keeping with the metamorpho-
sis of power from a central state into a twenty-first-century corporation 
fetishizing horizontal or decentralized—‘flattened’—modes of rule, 
the company called the Circle generates ‘inspirations’, injunctions that 
are scattered throughout the text as they are scattered throughout the 
paving stones and buildings in the Circle ‘campus’: ‘All that happens 
must be known’; ‘Secrets are Lies’; ‘Sharing is Caring’; and centrally, 
‘Privacy is Theft’. In both novels, these and similar political slogans 
are not the signature of a dystopian regime in and of themselves; they 
are so because they are reproduced with smiles and sincerity, embod-
ied and put into daily practice by those who submit to the theft of their 
individuality and freedom. 
Bread, circuses and resistance
The political importance and impotence of a privatized form of indi-
viduality is key in these novels. It is the form resistance takes in both. A 
defeated or disenchanted liberalism—but no less normative for that—
is the political thread that binds them: an individualism so frail it is 
barely the parody of a form capable of resistance. This individualism in 
turn is frail precisely because it is constituted by an understanding of 
the masses as antagonistic to privacy—the latter being the core social 
and experiential component for the model of individuality at work 
in the texts. 
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Two moments of resistance and its defeat, both of which rely on an 
understanding of the crowd or mass as almost irresistible and always 
antithetical to the individualism needed to fight it, illuminate the par-
allels. These dramatize an actual confrontation between an individual 
and the crowd, and end in the former’s defeat, thus demonstrating their 
constitutional antagonism. The atypical presence of embodied crowds in 
these two scenes is climactic, articulating the moment when the threat 
of the masses—conversely ever present in their dispersed, disembodied 
or mediated forms—overpowers the promise of resistance. 
Fittingly, in an ideal state that both fears and scorns the past, the avatar 
of that past, John the Savage, commits suicide at the end of Brave New 
World. The irruption of past into present triggered by the World State’s 
encounter with his hybrid of ‘primitivism’ and a Shakespeare-inflected 
modernity can cease, the past returned to the confines of the distant 
‘reservation’ as surely as individuality has been banished to the island 
for exiles. Helmholtz Watson and Bernard Marx are two such exiles, the 
latter a reluctant dissident, Watson the artist as detached modernist.12 
The scene of John’s suicide is an old lighthouse he has chosen as his 
‘hermitage’ because of its remoteness, natural abundance and beauty. 
Solitude is to be his reward for escaping the World Controller’s desire 
to continue with ‘the experiment’ he represented; but he soon becomes 
a tourist attraction, an entertaining spectacle of otherness, first to local 
‘Delta-Minus landworkers’, then to the reporters who flock ‘like turkey 
buzzards settling on a corpse’. One of them makes a film, The Savage of 
Surrey, which when released is ‘seen, heard and felt in every first-class 
feely palace in Western Europe’.13 
The film catapults ‘the Savage’ into a global public sphere, trapping him as 
an involuntary star. Swarms of ‘trippers’ assemble by his lighthouse: they 
arrive in helicopters like ‘locusts’ and alight, dozens of couples ‘staring, 
12 A third exile in Brave New World prefigures a move The Circle will also make: 
Mustapha Mond, the Resident Controller for Western Europe. Mond knows that 
the World State his authority embodies is just one way of living: there are alterna-
tives. He sacrifices his interests in ‘science’, Shakespeare and ‘truth’ as a political 
choice confirming his individuality. That both novels use elements from within the 
ruling order to explain the limits of the system illustrates the extent to which class 
tensions have been subsumed by the politics of individuality. 
13 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932), London 2014, pp. 214, 219, 224. Hereafter 
bnw.
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laughing, clicking their cameras, throwing (as to an ape) peanuts, pack-
ets of sex-hormone chewing-gum, pan-glandular petits beurres’—‘As 
in a nightmare, the dozens became scores, the scores hundreds.’ The 
couples—all heterosexual—are fascinated by the erotic dynamics of 
John’s self-flagellating rituals. They cry in unison for him to use the whip: 
‘In a slow heavy rhythm, “We—Want—the Whip” . . . “We—Want—the 
Whip” . . . they were all crying together . . . intoxicated by the noise, the 
unanimity, the sense of rhythmical atonement.’14 Strung tight on denial 
and restriction, ‘the Savage’ succumbs to the eroticized attraction of the 
crowd and, drugged with soma, joins in an orgy. The next morning, dis-
gusted by the recollection of his part in the event, he hangs himself.
Just over eighty years later, a similar dynamic—between crowd and indi-
vidual, complicity and resistance—is played out in The Circle, albeit one 
in which the eroticism is at a remove whilst ‘pain’ remains a ‘fascinating 
horror’.15 Mercer, one of the novel’s two focalizing agents for a normative 
horizon of individuality as composed of nature, art and solitude, takes 
himself ‘off-grid’. His are the words which, in letters and speeches to an 
ex-girlfriend captured by the Circle’s seductions, articulate the novel’s 
understanding of the good life. Solitude, silence and suffering again 
combine here, this time in a context where a global tech corporation 
has decided to abolish all three: ‘Suffering is only suffering if it’s done 
in silence, in solitude. Pain experienced in public, in view of loving mil-
lions, was no longer pain. It was communion.’16 
Mercer runs from this emerging totalizing world of ‘constant sur-
veillance’, aiming to put himself beyond reach of the cameras, social 
networks, digital-tracking chips, compliant or coerced governments; 
the apparatus of knowing and sharing that constitute this world’s cir-
cuits of power and its criminalization of privacy. He had hoped to live 
with a minority of unseduced others ‘underground, and in the desert, 
in the woods’—‘like refugees or hermits’.17 The Circle generates a new 
surveillance product, SoulSearch, whose purpose is to facilitate a type 
of crowd-sourced bounty-hunting: ‘fugitives’ are to be hunted down on 
camera and by cameras, watched by the billions who are also the produc-
ers of the spectacle being watched. 
14 bnw, pp. 225, 227.
15 Dave Eggers, The Circle, New York 2013, p. 227. Hereafter tc.
16 tc, p. 441. 17 tc, pp. 432–3.
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At a launch to demonstrate the potential of SoulSearch as an instru-
ment of criminal justice, a ‘fugitive’, an English child-murderer, is 
located and filmed in flight, pursued by crowds posting their video 
feeds to SoulSearch’s users, all within ten minutes. The demonstra-
tion itself is centred physically in the Circle’s Californian headquarters 
but takes place worldwide: the launch is simultaneously livestreamed, 
making public the search and capture of a human being by vigilante 
crowds—themselves remote participants in the livestreaming. Once 
the English woman has been captured, the company’s professionals 
and the mass of their eager users decide to track down ‘not another 
fugitive’ but ‘a regular civilian’. Within minutes, Mercer has been nom-
inated and then located in a remote part of Oregon. Cars and cameras 
are shown arriving at a house, then following Mercer’s truck as he flees 
them. Drones with cameras enrich the pursuit, ‘giving the audience 
an incredible grid of images, all of the drones well-spaced, providing 
a kaleidoscopic look at the truck racing up the mountain road through 
heavy pines’.18 The drones are fitted with audio and microphones, 
allowing the multitude of Mercer’s remote pursuers to speak to him, 
a mixture of reassurances and taunts that bleed into one another as 
he is warned that he must ‘surrender. You’re surrounded . . . You’re 
surrounded . . . by friends!’ Mercer drives his truck off a bridge, his 
facial expression—‘something like determination, something like 
serenity’—broadcast simultaneously with images of the truck, now a 
‘tiny object’, dropping ‘from the bridge overhead and landing, like a tin 
toy, on the rocks below’.19 
Reviewers of Eggers’s novel were not slow to hear echoes of Brave 
New World, but these identifications largely took the form of general 
parallels: both authors note tendencies in their respective cultures 
and extrapolate from these to create plausible warnings of a totalitari-
anism that may arrive in unexpected guises. There is no mention in 
these reviews—either descriptive or critical—of what is so singular and 
politically provocative about the two novels: their dramatization of the 
assumption that totalitarianism would come in ways embraced by the 
populations themselves.20
18 tc, p. 457. 19 tc, p. 461.
20 See, for example, Susannah Luthi, ‘Brainwash, Condition, Repeat: Dave Eggers’s 
The Circle’, la Review of Books, 27 November 2013; Betsy Morais, ‘Sharing is Caring 
is Sharing’, New Yorker, 30 October 2013. 
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That the crowd, the mass, the mob, crave strong rule, call it forth and 
constitute its raw material, is not in itself an atypical understanding of 
the mass of the population. It is a core component of thinking about 
social and political norms of order in the West—in particular, of the 
liberal tradition of political thought.21 But dystopian fiction, a genre 
inaugurated at the same moment as the ‘problematization’ of the crowd 
in the late nineteenth century, has tended to dramatize systems of rule 
as reliant to some degree on naked force and hence on fear.22 The ques-
tion to be asked of dystopias in which force and fear are not the media of 
rule is: why not? After all, such fictions are political not only in content 
but also in form. They are about politics and do politics. Hence they have 
to be about people as political subjects. For Raffaella Baccolini and Tom 
Moylan, the ‘totalizing agenda in the dystopian form’ consists of the 
text’s construction of ‘a narrative of the hegemonic order and a counter-
narrative of resistance’. The dystopian text typically begins ‘directly in 
the terrible new world’: 
Even without a dislocating move to an elsewhere, the element of textual 
estrangement remains in effect since the focus is frequently on a character 
who questions the dystopian society . . . a counter-narrative develops as the 
dystopian citizen moves from apparent contentment into an experience of 
alienation and resistance.23
In Huxley’s and Eggers’s texts, the questioning—or ‘counter-narrative 
of resistance’—comes most powerfully (which is to say, not very) from 
those outside of or marginal to the dystopian sphere. Their objections 
find no interlocutors among the ‘dystopian citizens’ themselves: indeed, 
their calls to individuality are defeated precisely by the illegibility of those 
calls to the inhabitants of dystopia as such. Representations of the mass 
of the people as lost to the collective, their latent individuality surren-
dered to it, are a necessary part of such fictions, however varied the guise 
used to articulate them. Dystopian representations help reproduce con-
temporary understandings of the political capacity of people as people, 
to be challenged or confirmed depending on the political trajectory the 
21 J. S. McClelland, ‘Liberalism’s Special Enemies: The Crowd and its Enemies’, 
in McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought, Abingdon 1996; also 
McClelland, The Crowd and the Mob, London 1989. 
22 See Christian Borch, The Politics of Crowds, Cambridge 2012.  
23 Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan, ‘Dystopia and Histories’, in Baccolini 
and Moylan, eds, Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination, 
Abingdon 2003, p. 5.
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fiction takes. Given the strength and endurance of the notion of ‘masses’ 
or ‘the mass’ and its many synonyms, much dystopian fiction relies on 
the idea that the masses are responsible, at some level, for their own 
subjection. Nevertheless Orwell’s boot stamping on a human face is a far 
more typical dystopian symbol than that same face happily chanting the 
name of its own subjection.
Leisure as oppression
Why is fear as a mode of rule absent in these two novels, structurally 
replaced by a happiness secured without friction? And why is resistance 
here resolutely individual, unable to imagine forms of collectivity which 
are not alien and implacably hostile to the very individuality resistance is 
premised on? Both texts figure resistance as necessarily individual, male 
and doomed, and figure ‘complicity’ as contentment, as a ‘mass’ phe-
nomenon. This is a cycle that dooms resistance even as it pushes it into 
ever more private, ever more precious, solitary realms. Both novels are 
conservative in form, and their resort to an ironic mode of narration is 
not incidental here: they can imagine only a privatized resistance, a form 
of individuality constitutionally alien to the subjects whose domination 
is the dystopian regime’s strength and horror. 
Fredric Jameson has described Brave New World as ‘very much an 
aristocratic critique of the media and mass culture, rather than of any 
totalitarianism’.24 This distinction points to Brave New World’s use of lei-
sure rather than labour as the real arena of exploitation or oppression, 
and of politics or the desire for ‘freedom’. It is an emphasis that recurs 
in Eggers’s novel, but for that to be visible it is necessary to historicize 
the use made of ‘leisure’. The distinction to be made here is political and 
historical. Huxley was committed to the high reaction of a self-conscious 
‘intellectual’ elite against ‘mass democracy’, yet considered himself a 
political dilettante until his turn to pacifism in the 1930s. The discursive 
regime he operated within was one insufficiently invested in utopian 
possibilities to be capable of producing what Jameson, talking about 
Zamyatin’s We, calls a ‘true anti-Utopia’.25 This should not be taken to 
mean that he was not interested in the political ideas that flourished 
24 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other 
Science Fictions, London and New York 2005, p. 202. 
25 Jameson, Archaeologies, p. 207.
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on the right in Western Europe after the First World War. The image of 
Huxley in the 1920s as a blithe aesthete is a complacent one.26 It evades 
the serious point of much of his writing in that decade, and also, pos-
sibly more importantly, the detached position he created for what he 
termed the ‘scientific’ view of politics: an observer aligned with no ‘side’ 
and consequently capable of criticizing all. The premise of this irony is 
that there is nothing that can be said about ‘all individuals’. There are no 
universalisms: hence, for a style constitutionally compelled to ‘debunk’ 
the universals which, though wrong, are being institutionalized every-
where, democracy is a physiological and psychological impossibility. 
The minds of ‘men’ are like their bodies, ineradicably different; equality 
cannot exist. On this view, no utopian thinking is possible: 
A century of growing democracy has shown that the reform of institu-
tions and the spread of education are by no means necessarily followed by 
improvements in individual virtue and intelligence.27
Here, I want to concentrate on what was peculiar about Huxley’s histori-
cal configuration, on his social location in the matrix of forces that were 
consolidating perceptions of a culture that was ‘mass’, and in the pro-
cess, transfiguring centuries-old tropes of ‘the masses’. This historical 
configuration will allow us to see the specificity of Huxley’s dramatiza-
tions of forms of mass-consciousness, and thus to recognize the possibly 
strange survival of those forms in The Circle. 
Margaret Atwood has underlined the contrast between the ‘brutal, 
mind-controlling totalitarian state’ in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, and 
the ‘softer forms of totalitarianism’ dramatized in Huxley’s novel, which 
turns on a regime of ‘conformity’.28 ‘Softness’ and ‘conformity’ are two 
of the defining tropes of masses in the inter-war years. The ‘mass man’ 
experiences his own individuality as alien to him, and frequently as a 
26 In his 1946 ‘Foreword’ to a reissue of Brave New World, Huxley, describing the 
novel’s ‘defects as a work of art’ (they are ‘considerable’ but it is ‘art’ nevertheless), 
notes his younger self ’s indifference to the novel’s airless closure: John the Savage 
‘ends in maniacal self-torture and despairing suicide. “And so they died misera-
bly ever after”—much to the reassurance of the amused, Pyrrhonic aesthete who 
was the author of the fable’ (bnw, ‘Foreword’, p. xlii). See ‘Introduction’, in David 
Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley, London 1994, p. vii. 
27 Aldous Huxley, ‘The Idea of Equality’ (1927), in Robert Baker and James Sexton, 
eds, Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays, Volume ii: 1926–1929, Chicago 2000, p. 156. 
28 Margaret Atwood, ‘Introduction’ to Brave New World, London 2007, p. vii. 
mcmanus: Eggers & Huxley 91
burden or object of fear: conformity is the inevitable result as he sur-
renders or abandons the individuality he is unfit for to escape into the 
soft embrace of the imitative, the pleasure of being one with the many. 
‘Mass’ is perhaps the most highly charged cultural signifier of the period. 
The compound ‘mass man’ entered recorded usage in 1928, preceded 
by ‘mass consciousness’ (1922), ‘mass thinking’ (1924) and ‘mass emo-
tions’ (1927); and followed in 1930 by ‘mass civilization’, then by ‘mass 
consumer’ (1931), ‘mass hatred’, ‘mass fear’ and ‘mass mind’ (1932), 
‘mass entertainment’ (1933), ‘mass hysteria’, ‘mass minded’ and ‘mass 
made thought’ (1934), ‘mass art’ and ‘mass public’ (1938). The earliest 
date the Oxford English Dictionary gives for ‘mass culture’ is 1934. Each 
of these compounds names not something new but the ‘mass’ relation 
of some older, true or original variant. In qualifying ‘man’ or ‘thinking’, 
‘art’ or ‘culture’, as ‘mass’, the new name signifies two processes—the 
degeneration of the thing named into a parodic antithesis of itself, and 
the slippage of the term ‘mass’ from its long established association 
with actual masses. You no longer had to be part of a crowd, physically 
or socially, to be part of a mass, rather the crowd had contaminated 
once-individual pursuits, practices, agents and objects. 
Clearly the crowd theory associated with Gustave Le Bon, and the later 
work on the fallacies of reason associated with Vilfredo Pareto, inform 
the semantic history of ‘mass-’ compounds in the inter-war years.29 The 
conjuncture in which ‘massness’ becomes mobile in the 1920s and the 
1930s has been well documented and explored.30 What has received less 
attention is how the accelerating proliferation of ‘mass’ terms in the 
1920s and 1930s was centred on modern leisure, whether as a potential 
realm of freedom or of enslavement. Where nineteenth-century anxieties 
about the capacity of the mass of the population to be reasonable beings 
had centred on labour and the practices that would organize it along 
class lines, the anxieties of the twentieth century pictured the masses as 
liable to be corrupted by their participation in leisure activities, a realm 
hitherto conceivable only as private. Those late Victorian discourses 
29 See ‘Introduction’ and two opening essays in Bradshaw, ed., The Hidden Huxley. 
These trace Huxley’s gravitation towards the work of crowd psychologists, elite 
theorists and eugenicists. See also Borch, Politics of Crowds, Chapter 6, ‘Reactions 
to Totalitarianism’. 
30 Examples are Patrick Brantlinger, Bread and Circuses, Ithaca 1984; John Carey, The 
Intellectuals and the Masses, London 1992; James Naremore and Patrick Brantlinger, 
eds, Modernity and Mass Culture, Bloomington 1991. 
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which confidently posited leisure as the potential realm of freedom 
seem quaint when set against the waves of concern about the ‘soften-
ing’, ‘sentimentalizing’, ‘massifying’ effects of popular fiction, music 
and film in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Jameson notes 
a shift of attention in the early part of the twentieth century from indus-
trial to informational production as the realm of alienation: ‘Rather than 
evoking alienated labour, we might rather speak of alienated leisure. For 
here we encounter that dimension of industrial production henceforth 
known as the media.’31 The field of leisure at the turn of the twentieth 
century was not itself a new one for working-class and lower-middle-
class people, but it was becoming newly structured or re-structured as 
a field of commodified pursuits, the circuits between them rendered 
fluid by rising levels of literacy, the new practices of publishing, and the 
technologies and objects of mass-reproduction which made everything 
increasingly accessible, from images and music to clothes, household 
furnishings and food, even as they became increasingly uniform.
The political economy of Huxley’s Brave New World—as in his non-
fictional writings from the same period—is indeed focused almost 
entirely on matters of governance rather than production. The subjects 
in need of governance, those who render its scope and responsibility so 
much more expansive and intensive than was once thought necessary, 
are the masses of ordinary people, their capacity to self-govern undone 
by leisure, the potential autonomy of their private lives surrendered to 
the delights of mass culture. Children may be engineered according to 
the needs of production, whose forces are sketchily global and unflag-
ging: certain embryos are conditioned to have a horror of cold, being 
‘predestined to emigrate to the tropics, to be miners and acetate silk 
spinners and steel workers’.32 Chemical workers are trained to toler-
ate lead, caustic soda, tar, chlorine; rocket-plane engineers are given an 
improved sense of balance so that they can cope with the amount of time 
they will spend spinning or moving upside down. Yet Brave New World’s 
economy is not capitalist: there is only one employer, the World State; 
there is no market, no competition.33 In one of the novel’s expository 
moments, the Resident World Controller for Western Europe makes 
31 Jameson, Archaeologies, p. 154. 32 bnw, p. 13.
33 There is money or some form of currency, however, the spending of which causes 
anxiety. The neurotic Marx remembers that he has ‘left the eau-de-Cologne tap in 
his bathroom wide open and running’, and is consumed with a need to get it turned 
off before it will ‘cost me a fortune’ (bnw, p. 87). 
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clear the secondary role played by production. The purpose of the World 
State is stability, not profit or even progress, and that is to be achieved 
by ensuring the efficient engineering and reproduction of desires: ‘The 
world’s stable now. People are happy; they can get what they want, and 
they never want what they can’t get.’34 
When John the Savage objects that such stability by necessity excludes 
the suffering from which individuality is formed, the suffering individu-
ality which runs like a red thread through his conception of the good life, 
the Controller agrees: 
That’s the price we have to pay for stability. You’ve got to choose between 
happiness and what people used to call high art. We’ve sacrificed the high 
art. We have the feelies and the scent organ instead.
The mass production of happiness in turn requires that leisure time 
be colonized, bent into shapes capable of absorbing and reproducing 
engineered desires for ‘entertainments’. For the beginnings of the World 
State, the ‘conscription of consumption’ rather than the means of pro-
duction had been foundational:
Old men in the bad old days used to renounce, retire, take to religion, spend 
their time reading, thinking—thinking! . . . now—such is progress—the 
old men work, the old men copulate, the old men have no time, no leisure 
from pleasure, not a moment to sit down and think.35 
In order to make workers ‘happy’ with their work, the World State 
had to absorb and turn to its purposes the intimate core of the pri-
vate sphere, the family. The privatized family—‘the foundation on 
which everything else is built’—is here re-engineered by Bokanovsky 
groups. Sets of human clones are ‘engineered’ according to specifica-
tions derived from Huxley’s understanding of manual and semi-skilled 
labour. All ‘lower-caste’ workers are designed to like their ‘childishly 
simple’ tasks and constitute the largest proportion of that ‘optimum 
population’: ‘modelled on the iceberg—eight ninths below the water, 
one ninth above.’ The World State has an ‘invention office’ stuffed with 
ingenious plans for saving labour, speeding it up, shortening the work-
ing day. None of these are necessary; on the contrary, they are socially 
34 bnw, p. 194. 35 bnw, pp. 194, 4, 47–8.
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unproductive, the World State’s purpose being not production but 
stability. But ‘Epsilon-Semi-Moron’, ‘Delta’ and ‘Delta-Minus’ work-
ers would suffer if deprived of their work: ‘It would be sheer cruelty to 
afflict them with excessive leisure.’36
The weak link in the reproduction of stability and of happiness is the 
‘Alpha’ caste, those required to perform managerial and intellectual 
tasks. Alphas are allowed consciousness of themselves as individuals. 
They are ‘separate and unrelated individuals of good heredity and con-
ditioned so as to be capable (within limits) of making a free choice and 
assuming responsibilities’. Designated the ‘upper-caste’ layer, Alphas 
are most dependent on the world of leisure to secure their continuing 
incorporation in the social body.37 Being relatively ‘unconditioned’, they 
are prone to yearnings—for solitude, for intimacy, silence, a sense of the 
ineffable or a higher purpose—which cannot be subsumed in consump-
tion or generate stability. To be capable of seeing and of recognizing 
freedom, to be capable of realizing an authentic self, requires solitude 
and silence. These conditions are the grounds of beauty, truth and art. 
For this caste, the daily regimes of sex, soma, golf, feelies and parties are 
the only key to stability. 
Transparency trap
Like Huxley’s World State, the global tech company called the Circle is 
a self-parodying blend of ‘utopian’ impulse and yearning for power. The 
latter enters the text as sinister or unspoken practice and is accessed by 
the reader in the complaints of those who are unseduced or rebel. The 
utopian impulse is explicit, performative of the Circle’s brand or phi-
losophy, and organizes the consumption of the company’s products and 
services but also the articulation of the responsibilities and privileges of 
its employees. Stenton, one of the ‘three wise men’ who run the Circle, 
focalizes the text on money and the company’s commercial ambition. 
The Circle, when it is articulated in his image, aims to monopolize the 
market in informational and communication services by eliminating 
competition and any hostile political forces. A key part of this ambition 
is the colonization of all the forms of the state concerned with public 
order and welfare. 
36 bnw, pp. 43, 197. 37 bnw, pp. 195, 133.
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Bailey, the second of the wise men, a figure of a pastoral or gently evan-
gelical mien, is invested with the energies and vocabulary of an older 
humanism, the utopian premise of which is human perfectibility. 
Committed to family, community and to living modestly yet imagina-
tively, Bailey opens a space in the text for the company to be posited as a 
vehicle for ‘progress’. The dream here fuses nineteenth-century liberal 
humanism and twenty-first-century technologies in a hybrid that com-
pletely undoes the fetishization of privacy as the medium of liberty. For 
Bailey, the company is on ‘the right side of history’, making possible and 
unavoidable a ‘fully participatory democracy’. With ‘full participation 
comes full knowledge’; politics will become transparent to itself; there 
will be no outside to representation:
We know what Circlers want because we ask, and because they know their 
answers are necessary to get a full and accurate picture of the desires of 
the whole Circle community. So if we observe the same model nationally, 
electorally, then we can get very close, I think, to one hundred per cent par-
ticipation. One hundred per cent democracy.38
Full participation, full knowledge of the participants’ desires, is not in 
itself either democratic or utopian unless that knowledge and those 
desires can be shaped to yearn for full participation and full knowledge. 
The production of just such yearning subjects is the company’s non- or 
only semi-commercial purpose. It does not so much wish to abolish the 
state as to subsume its purpose: to enable and reproduce a particular 
model of being. 
Mobilizing the older languages and values of community, participa-
tion and democracy, values key to the notion of civil society as a private 
sphere independent of the state and regulated only by contract or familial 
bonds, the company erodes the boundaries between work and not-work, 
dissolving the basis of the private sphere as such. The celebration of 
participation required of employees (coercive though not experienced 
as such) is ceaseless. Failure to participate—even momentarily—is met 
with a punitive form of concern, one oscillating between the hurt feelings 
of colleagues and the threatening moral rebukes issued by personnel 
or line managers. Here too there is to be ‘no leisure from pleasure’. 
Pleasure or personal performance and fulfilment have morphed so 
38 tc, pp. 385, 386.
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that labour—for the employee—becomes an intangible, unquantifiable 
thing: the subject does not ‘work’ so much as ‘participate’: a subject who 
does not work cannot stop working. Employees ‘invest’ in their own 
value by being constantly ‘on’. 
All this activity works for the Circle at three levels: the company has 
a workforce of compulsorily connected yet atomized subjects, cease-
lessly communicating yet ceaselessly competing; the valuable data the 
latter generate as a by-product of their paid work is monetized in various 
ways; third, by being so active, successful, and, crucially, by being so 
transparently fulfilled, the employees perform the model of subjectivity 
the company promotes, a type of humanity the company needs, which 
knows no secrets, no solitude, shame or suffering. It is utterly transpar-
ent to itself and to others: its memories, histories, family and friendship 
networks, desires, diet, health, are all the currency of that new visibility 
which is the means of perfectibility. According to Bailey, the voice of a 
corporate paternalism, the Circle is enabling the historic project of gath-
ering and making public all there is to be known. Full knowledge must 
also be public knowledge; all must be accessible to all.39 Once everything 
is fully transparent, nobody will do any wrong—either because the taboos 
that designated certain actions or practices as wrong will wither once dis-
infected with publicity,40 or because the psychic benefits of doing wrong 
would be far outweighed by the public opprobrium. 
The company’s technological innovations mean that complete knowl-
edge and complete transparency are now possible. The obstacles in the 
way of realizing this vision of total surveillance arise from the political 
value invested in privacy. This is the shrunken privacy of the twenty-
first century, rather than the more socially expansive private realm of 
Huxley’s class formation in the inter-war years. It continues to rest on 
the autonomy of the self and to be underpinned by the apparatus of 
private property. However, it can only be expressed in negative terms: 
the right to secrets, the right not to be known, the right to be left alone. 
Privacy here is not associated with any social spatial apparatus—the 
39 This does not include the company’s corporate dealings with powerful oppo-
nents: a mixture of bribes, blackmail and buyouts. 
40 The resonances with Julian Assange’s vision for WikiLeaks are explicit here 
and echo the disdain for Assange’s messianic politics of transparency in Jonathan 
Franzen’s Purity (2015)—see especially pp. 483–92: transparency destroys privacy 
by destroying the need for it.
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home for example—or temporal site: leisure or ‘free time’ has disap-
peared as its valorized medium.41
In a scene where he successfully persuades the employee Mae that 
secrets are ‘the enablers of antisocial, immoral and destructive behav-
iour’,42 Bailey describes the consequent model of subjectivity as the ‘best 
self’ we are capable of: 
My point is, what if we all behaved as if we were being watched? It would 
lead to a more moral way of life. Who would do something unethical or 
immoral or illegal if they were being watched? . . . We would finally be com-
pelled to be our best selves. And I think people would be relieved. There 
would be this phenomenal global sigh of relief. Finally, finally we can be 
good . . . we will finally realize our potential.43 
There are two objects of satire here. Just as Huxley took aim at the 
Wellsian aspiration to organize collective life more ‘intelligently’, 
Eggers takes aim at the techno-utopianism of the late twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Since his version of this contemporary form of 
political thinking is corporate, however, his satire draws in the practices 
that constitute a distinctly neoliberal form of labour, erasing the bound-
ary between work and leisure. If an employer requires an employee’s 
whole self at all times, there can be no part of that self left to be pri-
vate. Maurizio Lazaretto describes both the historical specificity and the 
expansive scope of such neoliberal absorption of non-paid labour time 
when he writes about the drive of modern management techniques to 
recruit the subjectivity of employees: such techniques ‘are looking for 
“the worker’s soul” to become part of the workplace. The worker’s per-
sonality and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organization 
and command.’44 
If Eggers’s novel were just this, however—a critique of techno-
utopianism and the neoliberal labour practices which it can cast as 
libertarian, collective or creative—it would be less significant. What 
41 Though ‘nature’ in its guise as ‘the great outdoors’ remains a valorized site of self-
knowing—see the return to possession of herself when Mae goes kayaking; and see 
too the use of Alaska to enable a fuller realization of a self in Eggers’s next novel, 
Heroes of the Frontier (2016).
42 tc, p. 239. 43 tc, pp. 290–2.
44 Maurizio Lazaretto, ‘Immaterial Labour’, in Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt, eds, 
Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, Minneapolis 1996, p. 133. 
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makes it interesting for a history of dystopian fiction is its restaging of 
both the old anxiety about the masses or ‘massification’ and of the only 
imaginable resistance to that as an individualism at once structurally 
central and politically crippled. As with Huxley, the two presuppose each 
other: the definitive feature of the mass—dematerialized or not—is its 
overcoming of individuality. Only the alienated individual can see this, 
can register the shock and horror of the various forms of deindividua-
tion. Although the radically atomized being is structurally necessary to 
bring the mass into view, that same individuation cannot be generalized 
as an effective normative horizon: the mass is composed of those who 
have surrendered their individuality to become immersed in the collec-
tive. Here, individuality can no longer be synonymous with humanity, 
for which another name must be found: ‘mass humanity’, for example, 
or—as in Eggers’s novel—‘the mob’. 
Modes of resistance and defeat 
For Georg Lukács, it could be said that the tragic hero was by definition ‘a 
lonely figure who strives to elevate himself above the merely human and 
the masses’.45 Though defeated, neither Huxley’s nor Eggers’s rebels are 
tragic. They are rather redundant heroes, intrinsically necessary to these 
dystopian fictions but incapable of going further than externalizing the 
resistance they merely stand for. Their character arcs trace the impossi-
bility of individuality in an era of deprivatization, which is designed from 
without but is embraced and internalized by the masses who cannot bear 
what it means to be private. In each novel, individualism’s defeat takes 
a feminized form. The gender politics around representations of ‘the 
masses’ are too complex and variegated to be engaged with here, but 
Huxley and Eggers follow a classic gendered division in the structure 
of oppression. The structures that oppress, and their immanent intelli-
gence or will, are masculine, self-contained and self-seeking, mobilizing 
in socially expansive forms all the properties of a ‘leader’, a political 
will that need not ever be physically present to be consequential, being 
embodied in the structures of the state or the company. Those led not 
by force but by joyous consent are feminized, the discursive strategies 
used to convey their seduction an assemblage of emotion, irrationalism, 
vulnerability to flattery, attraction to material and psychic comforts, and 
hyper-conventionality. Resistance in both texts is defeated—necessarily—
45 Jobst Welge, ‘Far from the Crowd’, in Schnapp and Tiews, eds, Crowds, p. 335. 
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but that defeat is given the form of a woman. In each text, a female 
character dramatizes a surrender of interiority, a form of social adapta-
tion, all the more total for being momentarily tested in the encounter 
between female consenter and male resister: a woman refuses the ‘free-
dom’ held out by a man and thereby secures his downfall. 
Lenina Crowne in Brave New World and Mae Holland in The Circle serve 
these dual functions. The former is present chiefly as an index of the 
success of conditioning—even in Alphas. Likewise, Mae is set on a path 
that leads to the absolute surrender of her self: an autonomous human 
being at the start of the novel, she has by its conclusion become a mere 
repository for and ventriloquist of corporately sanctioned, heartfelt 
‘feelings’. Both characters perform a certain amount of textual labour 
as they dramatize the efficacy of the techniques of deindividuation and 
de privatization. Particularly notable is what happens to conversation 
when it involves women. Adorno saw in the speech of Huxley’s charac-
ters (he singled out female speech for this) an index of a ‘degeneration of 
talk’ wrought by ‘objective tendencies’: 
The ladies of Brave New World—in this case extrapolation is hardly 
required—converse only as consumers. In principle their conversation 
concerns nothing but what is in any case to be found in the catalogues 
of the ubiquitous industries, information about available commodities. 
Objectively superfluous, it is the empty shell of dialogue, the intention of 
which was once to find out what was hitherto unknown. Stripped of this 
idea, dialogue is ripe for extinction.46
Dialogue that pursues the discovery of the unknown is of course still 
extant in the text. The key scene organizing the exposition of the World 
State’s laws, including the various historical ‘experiments’ made to test 
them, is composed largely of dialogue between the World Controller for 
Western Europe and the three rebels. The Controller, himself a reader 
of the illicit Shakespeare and nostalgic for ‘pure science’,47 speaks with 
the rebels on a basis of discursive equality: all recognize that knowledge, 
truth, individuality and freedom are sacrificed for ‘community life’, hap-
piness and stability. They share the text’s premise: that these things 
cannot co-exist. 
46 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber, Cambridge, 
ma 1997, pp. 101–2.
47 bnw, p. 200.
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The ‘ladies’ on the other hand are given the task of figuring that hap-
piness and stability in their speech. Crowne recoils from anything that 
threatens her learnt ‘incomprehension’ of individuality’s yearning for 
privacy. When Bernard Marx attempts to break her fear of privacy by tak-
ing her for a night-time flight over the English Channel, she is ‘appalled 
by the rushing emptiness of the night, by the black foam-flecked water 
heaving beneath them, by the pale face of the moon, so haggard and 
distracted among the hastening clouds’.48
She fills the annihilating space and silence with the hypnopaedic 
sentiments that both constitute the fear of her own individuality and 
guarantee a way out of it: 
Everyone works for everyone else. We can’t do without anyone. 
Even Epsilons . . . 
I am free. Free to have the most wonderful time. Everybody’s 
happy nowadays. 
These learnt sentiments are not mere convention: they organize the 
whole of her subjectivity: ‘‘‘I don’t understand anything,” she said with 
decision, determined to preserve her incomprehension intact.’49
Mae’s communication in The Circle becomes progressively emptier as 
she is absorbed into the Company—or rather absorbs the Company into 
her interior life. Speech is not the medium of this absorption, however; 
the sites of online ‘social’ activity are pressed into service instead. When 
Mae ‘volunteers’ to go ‘transparent’, she does so as part of a public scene 
of abject and ritualized surrender. Confessing her failure to publicize or 
to communicate parts of her life, she moves from humiliation to pride 
as her confession and discovery of the truth that ‘secrecy is part of, well, 
an aberrant behaviour system’ lend a veneer of sincerity and authenticity 
to the company’s pre-packaged slogans: 
secrets are lies
sharing is caring
privacy is theft
Though the subject of not very subtle manipulation, Mae experiences 
these ‘revelations’ as her own, as the hard-won knowledge of her 
48 bnw, p. 77. 49 bnw, pp. 78–9.
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experience. On stage she ‘turned to look at the three lines together. She 
blinked back tears, seeing it all there. Had she really thought of all that 
herself?’ Flushed with pride and what now passes for self-knowledge, 
Mae becomes a cipher for the company: going ‘transparent’ involves her 
wearing a camera that broadcasts live footage and audio of her every 
move and enables her followers (or ‘watchers’) to comment on and 
influence what she is doing. She is a communicative device always on, 
‘feeling daily the affection of millions flow through her’.50 Her inability 
to balk, to hesitate or to resist in any way this corporate hijacking of her 
self is part of, and arguably completes, the desubjectification of commu-
nication the Company is both built on and reproduces. Eggers skewers 
both the banality and the ease with which such communication is emp-
tied of its potential. Adorno’s words seem to prefigure Eggers’s fears: 
People completely collectivized and incessantly communicating might as 
well abandon all communication at once and acknowledge themselves to 
be the mute monads they have been surreptitiously since the beginnings of 
bourgeois society. They are swallowed up in archaic childlike dependency.51
Mae experiences as incomprehensible the words of those who are 
outside the network of incessant communication. Mercer’s objections—
before he dies—are a ‘madness’ she worries is ‘infectious’. Her response 
to his first letter, which he has written having seen her parents subjected 
to a bullying, exhausting level of attention from Mae’s ‘watchers’—the 
type of concern that demands instant and wordy reciprocity—is impa-
tient dismissal. Mercer uses this first letter to warn of a world in which 
Circlers ‘live willingly, joyfully, under constant surveillance, watching 
each other always, commenting on each other, voting and liking and 
disliking each other, smiling and frowning, and otherwise doing nothing 
much else’. The response to this warning is mediated by Mae’s watchers, 
by ‘the comments pouring through [the device on] her wrist’ which judge 
Mercer to be ‘young and dumb’, ‘a zero’. She does not finish reading the 
letter, dismissing it as ‘full of the same directionless blather’ as the para-
graph warning her of the world she inhabits. After Mercer’s death, the 
company re-categorizes him as ‘a very disturbed anti-social young man’. 
His being hunted down by the company is translated retrospectively into 
the language of ‘care’ and ‘concern’: the ‘community’ tried and failed ‘to 
bring him into the embrace of humanity’, to bring him back into the fold 
of a ‘world moving toward communion and unity’.52
50 tc, pp. 303, 311. 51 Adorno, Prisms, p. 102.
52 tc, pp. 359, 367, 368, 462–5.
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The other site of resistance in the text—Kalden, the third of the ‘wise 
men’ and the initial founder of the Circle, a mysterious boy genius 
or tech-geek, resolutely private—is also defeated by Mae. Kalden sees 
clearly, rationally, the dangers in the company’s expansion, in its colo-
nization of the most private of spaces and practices. He is the boss who 
appeals to the employee to stop sacrificing herself to the company, the 
multi-millionaire who wishes to burn his millions so that humanity 
can live freely, privately. This is not mediated ironically. In the novel’s 
penultimate chapter, Kalden makes explicit the novel’s buried premise: 
give people too much of what they think they want and the result is 
‘mob rule’. He appeals to Mae (off camera) to help him sabotage the 
company’s plans: 
Mae, once the Circle’s complete, that’s it. And you helped complete it. This 
democracy thing or Demoxie, whatever it is, good God. Under the guise 
of having every voice heard, you create mob rule, a filterless society where 
secrets are crimes.53
His words cannot penetrate what Mae has become. Rather than read to 
her ‘watchers’ the manifesto he has created, ‘The Rights of Humans in 
a Digital Age’, she informs on him. He is silenced, internally exiled to 
the bowels of the company’s campus, his individuality secured by his 
attempt to assert it, and as impotent as it is rare and precious. 
Why privacy? 
Brave New World and The Circle share a horror at the dissolution of the 
borders of private life as a result of shifting relations between work and 
leisure. This disappearance either constitutes or is based on an expan-
sion of the state, or of the corporation’s domination over all forms of 
life. Both texts acknowledge wryly that private life by itself can provide 
nothing in the way of material necessity: socialized forms of leisure 
may signal the abolition of privacy but they rest on socialized forms of 
employment. Full stomachs, secure jobs, healthcare and housing are 
here aligned with the colonization of leisure or ‘free time’. Private life by 
itself is in other words the scene of forms of deprivation, of need and suf-
fering, of inequalities and of humiliation. Nevertheless, it is posited as 
the scene equally of freedom. That this is an appallingly empty freedom, 
a skeletal even though proud autonomy, is not shied away from. Huxley 
53 tc, p. 483.
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explicitly, Eggers implicitly bring into the dramatization of dangerous 
pleasures the misery that provides their premise. 
Resistance is cast in these two texts as a refusal to be seduced. The 
relation of the oppressive totality to its subjects is one of seduction, 
not antagonism. Those who resist do so because they occupy or wish 
to access states—primarily but not only interior states—the totalizing 
structure is hostile to. Both texts restrict knowledge of these states (or 
of their desirability) to a few individuated subjects who, thwarted in 
their desires or made heroically unhappy by them, rebel. Their rebellion 
takes superficially different forms—selfish (Marx, Watson, Mercer) or 
altruistic (John the Savage, Kalden)—neither of which can reach beyond 
privacy as a goal. Brave New World exiles the selfish and eliminates the 
altruistic—he who would change the world to win the world. The Circle 
eliminates the selfish and internally exiles the altruistic. In each case, 
however, whatever its form, resistance itself is politically futile—the 
masses do not want what it stands for—though necessary in structural 
terms for the text to articulate its dystopian vision, and for the reader to 
be addressed as someone who knows this dystopia is dystopian. 
The ontology of the private self is thin, monstrously so, given the face 
of the challenges each text throws down to it. In Brave New World, this 
form of subjectivity has a purpose. Privacy’s dearth is offset by its pro-
ductions: art and science, beauty and truth; it saves ‘Culture’ from mass 
culture. The non-mass self may be unhappy, alone, subject to disease 
and death, or emotional upheavals and desires which may be barely 
articulable, let alone fulfillable; but these are the conditions of art’s pos-
sibility. The Circle offers no corresponding conception. Where it departs 
from the trail of its forerunner, and signals most sharply its own histo-
ricity, is in having no role for Culture, rather breaking or appearing to 
break the antagonistic symmetry between mass culture and the high-
modernist story of a Culture that was its own good. Huxley puts the 
tattered volume of Shakespeare found by a twelve-year-old John to good 
use to mark out and canonize the art of the past as a realm of truth and 
beauty, which does not merely speak to the fallen present but inspires 
it to imagine other more human—because more private—forms 
of life. Shakespeare and the shadows his work cast, including in the 
will-to-poetry of Helmholtz Watson, are not intended to be politically 
effective: on the contrary, they are mocked along with monogamy and 
the family for being both site and symptom of unhappiness, alienation 
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and frustration. Situating them along the pole of self and ‘nature’ allows 
Brave New World to do two things, however: it more effectively (because 
more richly) ontologizes the subject as private, and culture as neces-
sarily private too. The two are reciprocally tied if the self-as-private is to 
be anything more than grotesquely self-defeating, and if art is to be the 
antithesis of ‘happiness’, a place where not ‘the maintenance of well-
being’ but ‘some intensification and refining of consciousness, some 
enlargement of knowledge is possible’.54 In Brave New World, the figure 
of the writer is the ‘surviving warrant of cultural value’, the experiences 
of isolation and defeat less important than their existence as an index 
to the denatured or manufactured practices of mass culture, and to the 
people who desire these.55
Eggers seems to give up on art or Culture, handing their formal pres-
ence almost wholly over to the Circle. The culture of the past—and all 
its humanist valences as Culture—is now bought and paid for, locked 
into digital archives, Bailey’s Great Library, the Arnoldian project of ‘the 
best self’ now a matter of corporate total truth and transparency, the 
Enlightenment or the Renaissance a style of campus building. Eggers, 
that is, utilizes the tropes of ‘mass culture’ in his creation of a structural 
dichotomy between the private or individual self and a degraded social 
totality, but deprives the former of its alignment with Culture proper. 
What survives of that Culture is Mercer’s occupation, the arena of his 
prized ‘creativity’. Mercer is a figure of rugged small-town American 
individuality, an almost necessarily male figure since this is a providing 
and pedagogic model of individuality. The owner of a small business, 
he is also—and more so—a man of independence and of creativity. He 
makes chandeliers out of antlers for sale, ironically the very model of 
a ‘creative entrepreneur’—a free agent who lives his life blind to any 
border between labour and leisure—typically hymned by the neolib-
eralism the novel elsewhere takes as its object of critique. This is the 
model of subjectivity beloved of two generations of neoliberal policy for 
the ‘creative industries’ and the abolition of permanent jobs in favour of 
‘freelance hours’: while satirizing that neoliberal model, Eggers relies on 
54 bnw, p. 155.
55 Francis Mulhern, Figures of Catastrophe: The Condition of Culture Novel, London 
and New York 2016, p. 106. It should be noted that where there is writing, there is 
also reading. John the Savage does not need to be taught to read Shakespeare: the 
organic relation between literary writing and ‘life’ engenders a fluency or literacy 
all of its own. 
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it as the alternative and possible solution to corporate deprivatization.56 
This narrative turn is either a subterfuge or a sign of self-entrapment. 
Can you have mass culture without Culture? It remains to be seen. For 
in addition to the text’s use of a muscular creativity, potently independ-
ent no matter how defeated, there remains also the vastly more potent 
creativity of Eggers himself and of the type of literary enterprise with 
which he is associated. His novel inevitably inhabits the discursive 
nexus opened up by himself as a writer and expanded in the apparatus of 
publishing and philanthropic concerns he has spearheaded or funded. 
This is the prism through which The Circle was reviewed—and which, 
arguably, motivated the reviews, for the novel itself is bad: predictable, 
patronizing and almost wilfully devoid of the stylistic inventiveness that 
had seemed to be Eggers’s signature. There is no space here to explore 
the particular habitus associated with McSweeney’s, the publishing 
complex that Eggers has built over the past twenty years, or with the 
latter’s approach to questions of literary value or Culture.57 What is inter-
esting here is the material absence of Culture from the novel, as if it 
had become something unspeakable even though still structurally nec-
essary. It could be that two generations of postmodernism have made 
the hierarchies embedded in the ‘great divide’ too unpalatable, because 
too openly homologous with the violence of other inequalities. Mass 
culture has not withered away, but the primary language for naming 
it, Culture, has become less efficacious. A belief in Culture still exists, 
indeed is institutionally embedded in circuits similar to those of the 
1930s—though with a massively expanded role for universities—but it 
lacks a language, a medium of self-articulation, that is politically accept-
able in those who practise it. 
56 Mercer’s letters to Mae are akin textually or functionally to the parts of a mani-
festo: pp. 367–8 and pp. 432–3. See Sarah Brouillette, Literature and the Creative 
Economy, Stanford 2014, and Angela McRobbie, Be Creative, Cambridge 2016.
57 In Amy Hungerford’s recent study, we can trace the emergence of something akin 
to a cultural formation in which Culture takes on, openly, something of the ‘whole-
way-of-life’ Raymond Williams traced in the relations of the Bloomsbury group as 
a class fraction: ‘McSweeney’s and the School of Life’, in Making Literature Now, 
Stanford 2016; see Raymond Williams, ‘The Bloomsbury Fraction’, in Problems in 
Materialism and Culture, London 1980. 
